--- title: 'The Empire That Wants to Choose Its Neighbours’ Leaders: Lula, Maduro and America’s Crisis of Power' url: 'https://contextura.world/americas/the-empire-that-wants-to-choose-its-neighbours-leaders-lula-maduro-and-americas-crisis-of-power' markdown: 'https://contextura.world/americas/the-empire-that-wants-to-choose-its-neighbours-leaders-lula-maduro-and-americas-crisis-of-power.md' date: '2026-10-26' description: 'When American political commentators openly suggest abducting foreign leaders because they dislike election results, the problem extends beyond one politician. It exposes an imperial mindset that treats the sovereignty of other nations as conditional on their willingness to obey Washington. Brazil …' --- # [The Empire That Wants to Choose Its Neighbours’ Leaders: Lula, Maduro and America’s Crisis of Power](https://contextura.world/americas/the-empire-that-wants-to-choose-its-neighbours-leaders-lula-maduro-and-americas-crisis-of-power) 26th Oct 2026 **When American political commentators openly suggest abducting foreign leaders because they dislike election results, the problem extends beyond one politician. It exposes an imperial mindset that treats the sovereignty of other nations as conditional on their willingness to obey Washington.** Brazil has just delivered an electoral verdict that some people in Washington and within the American right would rather not see. On 25 October 2026, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva defeated Flávio Bolsonaro in Brazil’s presidential runoff, winning 51.79 per cent of valid votes and securing a fourth, non-consecutive presidential term. The result was close, but the decision belonged to Brazilian voters. Yet the reaction from sections of the American right has raised an alarming question: what happens when a foreign electorate refuses to produce the political outcome that powerful Americans want? A right-wing, Trump-supporting political commentator with a reported following of more than 700,000 Americans has reportedly responded to Lula’s victory by suggesting that Donald Trump send a team to kidnap the Brazilian president, invoking the American operation that seized Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro in January. The precise wording and identity of the commentator should be verified against the original post, but the political significance of the reported suggestion is unmistakable. When the abduction of a foreign head of state becomes a casual recommendation in political commentary, the boundary between legitimate disagreement and the normalisation of imperial violence has been badly eroded. ## From coups to abductions: the changing language of intervention For decades, the United States was associated across Latin America with military interventions, covert operations, support for authoritarian governments and efforts to remove leaders considered hostile to American interests. The historical record is extensive, although the circumstances and degree of American involvement differed from country to country. Guatemala in 1954, Chile in 1973 and the long history of American intervention in Central America and the Caribbean remain central to how many people in the region understand Washington's claims to defend democracy. The methods have changed over time, but the underlying question has not disappeared: who gets to decide the political future of a sovereign country? In some historical cases, the United States supported or helped facilitate the removal of governments. In others, it imposed sanctions, supported opposition movements, applied diplomatic pressure or intervened militarily. These actions cannot all be reduced to one identical policy, but together they have helped create a persistent regional suspicion that American commitments to democracy become flexible when democratic outcomes conflict with American strategic preferences. The January 2026 operation in Venezuela took this problem into particularly dangerous territory. American forces captured Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, in Caracas and transferred them to the United States to face criminal charges. The Trump administration presented the operation as an enforcement action against individuals accused of serious crimes. Critics, including legal experts, questioned its compatibility with international law and Venezuela's sovereignty. The United States' own decision to capture a sitting foreign president by military force has now created a precedent that others can cite when arguing that such actions are acceptable. This is where the reported call to kidnap Lula becomes more than an outrageous social media statement. It illustrates how an extraordinary act can become a political template. If a powerful country can seize a leader it considers criminal, illegitimate or strategically inconvenient, what prevents another country from using the same reasoning against a leader it dislikes? And what happens when every major power begins to decide for itself which foreign leaders deserve the protection of sovereignty? The danger is not simply that other governments might imitate Washington. It is that the rules restraining powerful states become increasingly dependent on whether those states find the rules convenient. ## The Monroe Doctrine and the idea of an American backyard The historical foundation of this attitude can be traced, in part, to the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. Originally, the doctrine warned European powers against further colonisation and political interference in the Western Hemisphere. Its early formulation was not identical to a declaration that the United States had the right to govern the Americas. Over time, however, American policymakers developed more expansive interpretations of the doctrine, including the Roosevelt Corollary of 1904, which claimed a justification for American intervention in Latin American countries. The consequences were substantial. American military occupations, interventions and political pressure shaped the histories of countries throughout Central America, the Caribbean and South America. During the Cold War, Washington frequently treated the possibility of left-wing governments, particularly those aligned with Cuba or the Soviet Union, as a security threat. In several cases, the language of anti-communism became a justification for supporting forces that undermined democratic institutions or helped establish authoritarian rule. The Monroe Doctrine's legacy is therefore not merely an old diplomatic document. It is the continuing contest over whether the Americas should be understood as a community of sovereign states or as a strategic zone in which Washington expects privileged influence. When American political figures speak as though the United States is entitled to decide who governs Brazil, Venezuela, Cuba, Colombia or any other country in the region, they revive the logic of the hemisphere as a backyard. But Brazil is not an American possession. Neither is Venezuela. Colombia, Peru, Mexico, Chile, Bolivia and the countries of Central America and the Caribbean are not extensions of the United States. Their citizens are not political dependants whose choices require approval from an American president. The same principle applies to Canada. The United States shares a continent with Canada, but geographical proximity does not establish political ownership. The fact that one country is more powerful than its neighbour does not confer a right to dictate the neighbour's domestic affairs. Sovereignty means little if it is respected only when a country's political choices are acceptable to the strongest state in its vicinity. ## Why is another country's sovereignty so difficult to respect? There is a striking contradiction in political movements that speak constantly about national sovereignty, border security and the right of a people to determine its own future, yet show little respect for those principles when the country in question elects a government they oppose. If Americans believe their country has the right to elect Donald Trump, why should Brazilians not have the right to elect Lula? If Americans insist that foreign governments must not interfere in their elections, on what basis should an American commentator propose kidnapping a Brazilian president because he dislikes the result? If political independence is a universal principle, it cannot become a privilege reserved for people who vote for the preferred candidate. This contradiction is not exclusive to the American right, and not all Trump supporters endorse intervention abroad. Many Americans oppose unlawful military action and defend the sovereignty of other nations. The criticism here is directed at a particular political tendency: the belief that American power should be exercised without the restraints that its advocates would demand if another country exercised comparable power against the United States. Imagine China abducting an American president and transporting him to Beijing to face charges under Chinese law. Imagine Russia announcing that it would temporarily supervise the United States until it found an acceptable political leadership. Imagine a foreign military force entering Washington because it had decided that an American administration was dangerous, illegitimate or unfit to govern. Would the people advocating the abduction of Lula regard such actions as acceptable if they were directed at their own country? The likely outrage would be enormous. American politicians would invoke sovereignty, national dignity, constitutional order and the right of the American people to choose their own government. Those are legitimate principles. The hypocrisy lies in treating them as universal rights when America is the potential victim but optional rules when America is the actor. This is the moral test of international politics: whether a principle survives the moment it becomes inconvenient to one's own side. ## The politics of minorities and the fear of losing dominance A related contradiction appears in debates over immigration, race, demographic change and minority status. Some political voices dismiss the concerns of minorities by asking why it should matter if one group becomes less dominant or finds itself outnumbered. Yet some of those same voices react with alarm to the prospect that white Americans might lose their demographic majority, that traditional cultural dominance might weaken, or that political power might be shared more broadly. There is a question worth asking: if being a minority is harmless, why does the possibility of becoming one provoke such anxiety? The answer is not that every person who fears demographic change secretly intends to oppress others. Demographic anxiety can arise from concerns about cultural continuity, economic security, social trust and political representation. Those concerns deserve to be examined rather than automatically dismissed. But when the fear is specifically that another group might acquire the influence, visibility or institutional power previously monopolised by one's own group, it raises a deeper issue: is the objection really to minority status, or to the possibility of losing dominance? Being a minority does not automatically mean being persecuted. Nor does being a numerical majority guarantee security or fairness. What matters is whether institutions protect people's rights regardless of their numbers, ethnicity, religion or political affiliation. A society that protects only the dominant group is not defending equality. It is defending a hierarchy. This logic has an international equivalent. A powerful country may claim that its leadership is necessary for order, stability or civilisation, while treating the independence of weaker countries as a threat. It may describe its own intervention as protection while describing similar actions by rivals as aggression. In both cases, the underlying assumption is that power grants privileges that others should not possess. The comparison is not exact, but the structure of the contradiction is similar. A principle is celebrated when it protects one's own position and rejected when it threatens that position. That is why debates over American intervention and debates over minority status can illuminate the same question: do people believe in equal rights, or do they believe their own group deserves a special exemption? ## Is the existence of the United States itself the problem? Across Latin America, some critics express a much more radical frustration: that the emergence of the United States as a continental power has been one of the most damaging developments in the region's history. Some use religious or moral language to describe American power as evil or even demonic. Such expressions are best understood as political condemnation rather than literal historical explanation. The more serious argument beneath that rhetoric concerns geography, power and history. The United States emerged as a vast continental state through territorial expansion, war, displacement of Indigenous peoples and the acquisition of land from neighbouring powers. Its economic and military growth subsequently gave it extraordinary influence over the Western Hemisphere. That position enabled Washington to shape trade, security arrangements, political alliances and, at times, the domestic trajectories of other countries. It would be historically simplistic to attribute every conflict, economic crisis or political failure in the Americas to the United States. Latin American countries have their own political elites, internal conflicts, authoritarian movements, corruption and institutional weaknesses. European colonialism, global economic structures and the actions of other major powers have also shaped the region. The United States has not been the sole author of Latin America's difficulties. Yet it would be equally dishonest to pretend that American power has been an innocent bystander. From territorial expansion and intervention in Mexico to Cold War operations and support for anti-communist regimes, Washington has repeatedly pursued interests that imposed severe costs on other societies. The result has been a lasting distrust that cannot be erased by speeches about freedom and democracy. The strongest criticism, therefore, is not that ordinary Americans should never have existed or that the country's people are inherently malicious. It is that the world has had to contend with an exceptionally powerful state whose leaders have too often treated their own strategic interests as more important than the independence of other peoples. The problem is not the existence of American citizens. It is the assumption that American power should carry fewer restraints than the power of everyone else. A country can be a democracy at home while supporting undemocratic outcomes abroad. It can defend constitutional rights for its citizens while disregarding the political agency of foreigners. It can celebrate its own independence while attempting to narrow the independence of its neighbours. Those contradictions are not incidental to the history of great-power politics. They are among its defining dangers. ## Chaos can be a form of control The claim that the United States has abandoned coups and now merely creates chaos is too sweeping. Coups, covert influence, economic pressure, diplomatic isolation and military intervention are different instruments, and their use varies across administrations and circumstances. But the concern behind the claim deserves attention: destabilisation can weaken a country even when the intervening power does not install a government directly. Political division can make regional cooperation more difficult. Sanctions can intensify economic hardship, although their effects depend on their design and the wider conditions of the targeted country. Support for competing political factions can deepen internal conflicts. Military threats can encourage governments to divert resources from development towards security. When these pressures interact with domestic failures, the consequences can persist long after a particular administration has left office. A fragmented South America is less able to negotiate collectively over trade, energy, natural resources, migration, climate policy and security. Governments that distrust one another may become more dependent on external powers, while domestic political actors can use foreign alliances to strengthen their own positions. This does not mean that all regional divisions are manufactured by Washington. It means that external interference can exploit existing divisions and make cooperation harder. The irony is that a foreign policy justified in the name of stability can create the very instability it claims to prevent. When leaders and citizens begin to believe that their electoral choices may trigger foreign punishment, the credibility of democratic institutions suffers. When governments fear that economic or political independence will provoke intervention, national sovereignty becomes a permanent struggle rather than a settled principle. If the United States wants a stable hemisphere, it should be building relationships based on mutual respect, predictable rules and legitimate diplomacy. It should not encourage the belief that a government is entitled to remain in power only if Washington approves of it. ## Lula's victory is not a declaration of war on America Lula's reelection does not mean that every policy of his government is correct, that every criticism of him is illegitimate or that Brazil should be exempt from scrutiny over corruption, democratic governance or human rights. Brazilian voters are entitled to debate their president's record, just as Americans are entitled to debate theirs. But disagreement with a foreign leader is not a licence to abduct him. A government can criticise Lula, negotiate with Brazil, impose lawful and proportionate measures where justified, or seek to persuade Brazilian voters through peaceful engagement. It cannot simply assume that a different electoral outcome would be preferable and then treat the country's elected leadership as an obstacle to be physically removed. The same principle applies to Maduro, irrespective of one's opinion of his government. Serious allegations of criminal conduct do not automatically grant another state unlimited authority to use military force inside a sovereign country and seize its head of state. Criminal accountability, extradition, international cooperation and the use of force are governed by different legal rules. A powerful country cannot settle the question of legality merely by announcing that its target is a criminal. If the capture of Maduro is celebrated as proof that the United States can remove an unwanted leader, the reported suggestion that Lula should be kidnapped reveals the dangerous next step in that reasoning. Today it is a leader whom a section of the American right despises. Tomorrow, the same logic could be applied to a leader who challenges another major power, refuses a military alliance, nationalises a strategic resource or simply pursues an independent foreign policy. Once the principle becomes acceptable, there is no reliable way to limit its application to one's political enemies. ## The world cannot be governed by the preferences of one capital The question raised by Lula's victory is bigger than Brazil and bigger than Trump. It concerns whether international relations will be governed by rules that apply to powerful and weak countries alike, or by a hierarchy in which the strongest state claims a special right to decide what is acceptable elsewhere. If the United States insists that its own sovereignty is sacred, it must recognise the sovereignty of Brazil. If it insists that Americans have the right to choose their leaders, it must recognise that right in Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and every other country. If its politicians condemn foreign interference in American elections, they must reject calls to interfere in other countries' political futures through threats and abductions. The Monroe Doctrine belongs to a different historical era, but its legacy remains relevant wherever American leaders assume that the Western Hemisphere is theirs to manage. A modern and peaceful Americas cannot be built on the idea that the United States is entitled to veto the political choices of its neighbours. It must be built on the principle that independence does not require Washington's permission. Lula's reelection should therefore be understood for what it is: a decision made by Brazilian voters. The reported call to kidnap him should be understood for what it is: a disturbing expression of the belief that another country's democratic choice can be overridden when it displeases a powerful foreign audience. The United States is not condemned by geography, and its people are not destined to act as imperialists. But American power will continue to generate resistance for as long as some of its political voices confuse dominance with legitimacy and coercion with leadership. The world does not need America to disappear. It needs the United States to accept that it is one country among many, not the owner of a hemisphere. The alternative is a world in which every powerful state claims the right to seize its opponents, every smaller country must fear the displeasure of a larger neighbour, and every election becomes potentially subject to foreign approval. That is not democracy. It is imperial privilege dressed in the language of law and order. **The test of American leadership is not whether Washington can remove a leader it dislikes. It is whether Washington can respect a people whose choice it dislikes.** ### Sources and further reading - Reuters, *Brazil's Lula reelected president in runoff vote*, 26 October 2026: https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/brazils-lula-reelected-president-runoff-vote-2026-10-26/ - Brazil's Superior Electoral Court, official announcement of Lula's reelection and election results, 26 October 2026: https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2026/Outubro/presidente-do-tse-anuncia-reeleicao-de-lula-e-faz-balanco-do-2o-turno-das-Eleicoes-2026 - UK House of Commons Library, *The US capture of Nicolás Maduro*, 6 January 2026: https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10452/ - US National Archives, *The Monroe Doctrine (1823)*: https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/monroe-doctrine - US Department of State, Office of the Historian, *New Policies for Latin America, Asia*: https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/short-history/newpolicies --- ## Navigation - Parent: [Americas](https://contextura.world/americas.md) - Next: [Trump Did Not Invent Republican Cruelty. 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